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Abstract: This paper considers the implications of the growing trend for 
engineer-to-order (ETO) companies to engage in projects that involve not just 
the design and  manufacture of capital plant and equipment, but also 
responsibility for downstream aspects of the project such as operations, 
maintenance and service delivery. These types of long-term, service-focused 
projects introduce an added dimension of complexity to the project that stems 
from a proliferation of stakeholders and multiple ‘customers’ within the 
project. Drawing on three detailed case studies of projects with a long-term, 
service focus, the paper explores the problems facing ETO companies and 
their project managers in terms of identifying who the customer really is at 
any particular stage of the project and highlights some implications for the 
management of the design and innovation process in such ETO projects.    
 
Keywords: Engineer-to-order; long-term projects; customers; clients; project 
management.  
 
Bibliographic notes: Chris Ivory is a Lecturer at Newcastle University 
Business School. His background is as a social scientist. His research interests 
include innovation and technology management, history of technology, critical 
management approaches to project management, and the management of 
complex projects. Chris is a member of the British Academy of Management 
and the European Academy of Management. 
Neil Alderman is a senior lecturer at the University Newcastle University 
Business School. His background is as a geographer. His research interests 
include innovation and technology management, product development in 
engineering (with particular reference to engineer-to-order companies), 
innovation in large-scale projects, and the management of complex projects. 
Neil is a member of the British Academy of Management, the European 
Academy of Management, and is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society 
(with the Institute of British Geographers). 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
Engineered-to-order (ETO) capital products have become characterised by 
increasing technical complexity, often referred to as complex product systems 
[1], and increasingly complex types of project system within which they have 
to be delivered. One aspect of this is the growing trend towards projects that 
involve the ETO manufacturer in not just design and delivery of the product, 
but also the downstream service component or operations phase of the project 
[2]. One consequence of this growing complexity is the proliferation of 
multiple stakeholders within a network of project participants that creates a 
multitude of different demands on the ETO organisation and establishes 
multiple ‘customers’ within the project. A key problem for ETO organisations 
in this context is identifying which, at any given point in the project, is the 
critical customer. 
 
ETO organisations are usually characterised as ‘project-based organisations’ 
[3]. In such organisations, the dominant mode of operation is through 
formalised project management under the control of a cadre of professional 
project managers. This mode of management is predicated on a hierarchical, 
top-down, approach to the decomposition of the project and the monitoring 
and control of individual work tasks within the overall project structure, 
overseen by a manager with responsibility for the delivery of the project as a 
whole for a clearly identifiable client [4]. Our intention in this paper is to 
argue that certain dimensions of increasing project complexity renders the 
latter assumption problematic.  
 
We therefore consider the implications of growing project complexity for ETO 
organisations and those responsible for managing large-scale one-off projects 
with a strong focus on the service output demanded by the project’s client. We 
draw on in-depth case study research into three such long-term service-
focused projects. Our findings have implications for the assumptions made 
about such projects and the appropriate ways to manage them. 
 
In the following section of this paper we present some background to the 
phenomenon of long-term service-focused projects. The next section describes 
a research project in which we studied three such projects in some detail. The 
subsequent sections deal with the detailed description of these projects and 
demonstrate the ways in which ambiguity and uncertainty about who the 
customer was or should have been arose. Finally, we draw some conclusions 
and implications for ETO organisations and their project managers. 
 
 2 Background 
 
Recent research [5] has identified the emergence of a new business model for 
organizations operating in the sphere of large-scale, complex, engineering and 
IT service projects. This model reflects a shift from the conventional design 
and supply of large products or technical systems on a project basis to the 
enhancement of these projects through the development of long-term service 
provision [6]. Typically, it involves contractors taking on responsibility for the 
operation and/or maintenance of the facility on the client’s behalf and reflects 
a more general trend towards the outsourcing of activities by many client 
organisations [7]. Examples may be found in many sectors, including 
railways, power generation, offshore oil, utilities, telecommunications and IT. 
Such projects have also emerged as a new development in the construction 
field, where a combination of public-private partnerships and (in the UK) the 
Government’s Private Finance Initiative have created a shift from a focus on 
asset delivery to one of service delivery [8].   
 Empirical evidence suggests there are three principal contexts in which this is 
happening. Firstly, faced with stagnating demand and a growing installed base 
of products, manufacturers are being prompted to move their activities 
downstream in terms of the value chain into product support and related 
service activities [9], where new kinds of customer demands and a greater 
proportion of customer expenditure is to be found. Secondly, companies such 
as engineering project organisations or IT ‘solution providers’ have sought to 
increase their scope of supply through the delivery of additional services to 
their clients, including the through-life operation or maintenance and support 
of their facilities in order to increase operating margins or market share. This 
is leading to the design and delivery of ‘integrated solutions’ [10] for clients, 
which provide an important new way of differentiating the product/service 
offering. In these two positions companies are responding to changing 
demands from their clients as they outsource more manufacturing and seek to 
concentrate on service provision to their own customers. The third context is 
that of organizations for which the internal delivery of ETO projects is a major 
part of their own business, such as utilities or chemical process companies, 
and where the complexity of the project creates the need for the internal 
capital delivery team to address operational and other downstream service 
issues in a more consistent manner.  
 
There is little contention that customers should be the key focus of any 
organisation. This view indeed plays a central role in the design and 
innovation process, and is deeply embedded in management thinking [11]. 
Such is the currency of the customer as a strategic focus for organisations that 
Du Gay and Salaman [12] have referred to it as a ‘cult of the customer’. The 
influence of this discourse is extremely powerful in the capital goods sectors 
like construction [13] and IT [14]. Capital goods production is defined in part 
by having a single commissioning client, while project success in capital 
goods production is most clearly measured in terms of client satisfaction. As 
Winch et al. [15] point out, perfectly well run projects, if they do not maintain 
a customer focus, are likely to fail by not actually producing facilities that 
meet the client’s needs. Clearly, when that requirement is specified in terms of 
service outputs rather than the capital facility itself, a successful delivery of a 
capital good may yet not satisfy the client in terms of the downstream services.   
 
Winch et al. suggest that project organisations should actively focus on client 
requirements and develop quality management approaches to ensure that all 
actions reflect that focus. However, the trend in capital goods delivery noted 
above is beginning to complicate this ‘client focus’. As ETO manufacturers 
are being drawn into long term maintenance and facilities management 
contracts associated with the capital goods they produce, they find that their 
own maintenance and facilities management functions are also becoming their 
customers. Furthermore, the trend toward the outsourcing of expertise by 
clients introduces independent consultants into the project network, each 
acting as the ‘voice of the customer’. The result is that ‘the customer’ for 
different aspects of the project is becoming distributed across a plethora of 
different organisations. This makes it difficult for the ETO manufacturer to 
identify a single client, while at the same time fostering the need to actively 
create internal clients that are capable of providing the project with the right 
focus, what we would term the critical customer. The problem arises then that, 
in contexts where design is itself distributed across a number of loosely 
connected suppliers and design teams, there may not even be agreement as to 
who the customer is.   
 
This complexity creates a context in which understanding who the customer is 
at any particular stage of the project and in relation to specific design 
decisions that need to be taken can be problematic and can lead to unmet 
expectations and unsatisfied requirements later in the day, notably once the 
capital facility is commissioned and the project is into the operations phase. 
To illustrate these ideas and to identify how organisations are tackling this 
conundrum of complexity in long-term service-focused ETO projects, we 
draw on three detailed case studies of projects that fit this particular 
description. 
 
 3 The research 
 
The research reported here involved the in-depth study of three projects 
identified a priori as long-term and service-focused [16]. The projects were: 
the refurbishment and operation of a port facility for an Argentinean 
steelworks by Clarke Chapman Ltd; ALSTOM Transport’s contract to design 
and maintain the Pendolino high-speed tilting train for Virgin Trains’ West 
Coast Main Line franchise in the UK and a Regional Sludge Treatment Centre 
(RSTC) commissioned and operated by Northumbrian Water Ltd (NWL) in 
the North East of England. These companies acted as co-sponsors and 
collaborators in the research.  
 
The research methodology was essentially qualitative, involving in-depth 
interviews with key project participants in order to develop a deep 
understanding of the nature and conduct of the projects. In each case study the 
research mapped out the project network and identified all the key actors in 
the project. Interviewing commenced with the principal contact within each 
collaborating company and was extended to the collaborator’s project team, or 
representatives thereof when it was particularly large as in the case at Alstom. 
Subsequently, the principal supply chain and other organizations associated 
with the project were identified and contact was made with the assistance of 
the collaborating company as appropriate. Interviews were also held with the 
client, although for both logistical and cultural reasons this was not possible in 
the Clarke Chapman case, and with other related institutions such as the 
regulators, consultancies and other third parties actively involved in the 
project.  
 
The research involved 50 interview sessions with one or more respondents 
lasting between one and three hours; 21 for the Pendolino project, 15 for the 
port facilities project and 14 for the RSTC project. Interviews were 
triangulated through a process of cross-checking of stories with other accounts 
and sources, including secondary sources such as industry journals and project 
documents as appropriate. Additionally, a series of workshops were held with 
the collaborating companies, one of which specifically addressed the question 
‘who is the customer’ and explored the implications for the participants of the 
developments in project complexity implied by the discussion in the previous 
section and reflected in their own projects.  
 
 4 The case studies 
4.1 The Regional Sludge Treatment Centre 
 
The Northumbria Water Limited (NWL) Regional Sludge Treatment Centre 
(RSTC), located at Bran Sands on the Tees estuary, was a £122m state-of-the-
art sludge drying facility built between 1993 and 2002 to serve the UK’s 
Northeast region. The impetuous for the plant was the banning of sea disposal 
as part of the EU Urban Waste Water Directive, requiring NWL to render the 
sludge inert, and thus safe to dispose of in other ways. Previously, NWL had 
collected sludge from primary treatment sites around the NE and disposed of it 
directly into the North Sea.  
 
The completed project now forms the hub of a number of primary treatment 
sites across the region. Once collected by these local plants the sewage sludge 
is transferred by ship and road for final treatment at Bran Sands on Teesside. 
Sludge produced at the Bran Sands Effluent Treatment Works, a separate 
industrial effluent plant on the same site and built at the same time as the 
RSTC, is transferred to the RSTC direct by pipeline. The RSTC converts both 
sets of sludge into inert low-volume pellets with a variety of possible 
downstream uses in agriculture, horticulture, land reclamation, or as a fuel. 
NWL made extensive use of consultants and specialist engineering suppliers 
in the design and construction of the RSTC, but operates the plant itself. The 
project is regarded by NWL to have been a great success and has attracted 
worldwide attention (including a Stockholm Industry Water award). 
 
NWL was formed in 1974 as a publicly owned utility but in 1988, due to 
rising debt and a falling profit stream, began to transform itself into a ‘profit 
centre’ ahead of privatisation in 1989. In the process of privatisation NWL 
restructured and eliminated non-essential functions, including its engineering 
arm, which subsequently became Environmental Technology (Entec), one of 
NWL’s key consultants on the RSTC project.  
 
The technology needed to dry the sludge was new to NWL, making it heavily 
reliant on the knowledge of consultants and specialist suppliers. Design, it was 
noted by the NWL project manager, had increasingly moved out to consultants 
for strategic reasons and, as a consequence, NWL managed at a fairly high 
level with less involvement in the detail of technical designs. The NWL 
project manager’s role was to ensure that NWL received value for money, 
understood what it was getting from the project and that it obtained what it 
expected: something it could feel “comfortable with operating for the next 
twenty years or so”. After an initial scoping study, Entec acted as a second tier 
of control responsible for the day-to-day management of the project. 
Nevertheless, NWL project managers still tried to attend progress meetings. 
As the same project manager put it, “contractors do like to see the face of the 
client, it gives confidence to the contractors that the client is involved and is 
happy”.  
 
4.1.1 Making operations the customer 
 
NWL, as both joint project manger for the project and client for it, recognised 
that it needed to ensure that its project delivery team would deliver something 
which not just fulfilled a specification, but which fulfilled the more difficult to 
articulate requirements of the plant operators who would actually run the 
plant. NWL, we were told by the Investment Delivery team manager (NWL’s 
own project team), had been disappointed in the past by the failure of project 
outcomes to actually meet business needs. It was felt that technical staff in 
lead positions on project teams often took a very engineering-focused view 
and that not enough attention was paid to the implications of design choices 
for downstream operations. Put another way, the Investment Delivery team 
was the wrong customer focus for the RSTC project because of their emphasis 
on meeting hard delivery targets rather than operational needs. There had 
traditionally been a clear responsibility split between plant construction and 
operations, so that only those aspects of the project which had been 
commissioned became the operational manager's responsibility, leaving the 
project entirely under the control of the Investment Delivery function right up 
until plant start-up. In the case of the RSTC, NWL had the added problem of 
dealing with a technology that was unfamiliar to both management and 
operations staff, in so much as it comprised a continuous sludge drying 
process rather than the civil engineering-based works (i.e. settlement tanks and 
‘pipe work’) that they were familiar with.  
 
Senior management at NWL thus recognised the need to draw operations in as 
the critical customer. In seeking to bring together the imperatives of the 
project delivery team (time and cost) and the needs of operations, NWL 
created a specific Project Sponsor (PS) role. The PS in effect acted as the 
internal customer for the project. The RSTC project was one of the first NWL 
projects in which a PS of this type was used. Having identified a need brought 
on by regulatory changes, the PS was appointed and tasked to translate this 
need into a project that delivered in accordance with the organisation’s 
business requirements. This involved the PS overseeing the project from 
feasibility through to completion. In this instance the PS was appointed from 
an operations background in order to bring an ‘operator’s eye’ to the project. 
Ultimately, just like a customer, the Project Sponsor, rather than the Project 
Manager, had final responsibility for accepting the project at the evaluation 
stage.  
 
At the time of the RSTC project, NWL had also determined that its Investment 
Delivery teams should also report to an Acceptance Management Team. Again 
these were specialist engineers whose role was to ensure that Investment 
Delivery’s design management reflected operational needs. Procedures were 
specified in the investment delivery handbook dedicated to acceptance 
management, which promoted thinking about operational issues early in the 
project.  
 
4.1.2 Creating a customer for the end product 
 
The business requirement for a commercially useful end product meant that 
the commercial arm of the business was also an internal customer for the 
project. The need to create customers directly influenced the design. For 
example, pre-digesters were not used to process the sludge prior to drying so 
as to maximise the calorific value of the dried pellets which formed the end 
product. This increased the number of uses to which it could be put.  
   
4.1.3 To be or not to be the customer 
 
Specialist suppliers formed a key part of the project and, because failure to 
procure the right technology might ultimately mean the failure of the project, 
the choices made here formed a key source of risk. To control this risk NWL 
decided that, with the support of its consultant Entec, it would act as the direct 
customer for the supply of the technology. The alternative was to contract the 
whole package out to a contractor (drying technology plus buildings, 
pipelines, storage tanks and so on), but it was feared that the contractor would 
build its own preferred solution (i.e. it would become the customer for the 
technology) and NWL was not yet sufficiently clear about the sort of solution 
that would suit its needs best. The choice to be a hands-on customer, therefore, 
appears to be related to the perceived risks associated with those decisions. 
NWL and Entec organised a design competition between four main suppliers 
 Phase two of the RSTC was essentially a repeat of phase one (about 95% of 
the plant was identical) so experience gained in constructing phase one was 
directly applicable to phase two. One of the key mechanisms for getting feed-
back into the design was the Design Operators Group (or the DOG). This 
group monitored the operation of the plant in order to identify operational 
problems (excessive wear, clogging filters, break-downs), which could be 
resolved through post-hoc design work. The DOG involved operators, 
members of Investment Delivery, Andritz and, where appropriate, other 
members of the supply chain. Meetings of the DOG were held monthly and 
faults reported. The meetings were aimed at identifying solutions or at setting 
in motion the means to do so. This group effectively formed another customer 
for the technology supplier, Andritz, from which it received observations 
about the operation of the plant. From Andritz’s perspective, this shifted the 
perceived customer from being the Investment Delivery team and PS to being 
an operator’s group.  
4.1.4 Summary 
 
What this project shows is that in long-term customer-focused projects the 
client’s project team is not necessarily the best customer focus for external 
suppliers, particularly when the key concern is delivering the right product for 
operations (as opposed to, say, a least-cost solution). NWL solved this issue 
by re-constructing their Investment Delivery team as part of the supply side 
and then constructing the PS (effectively a representative of operations) as the 
customer. After delivery, Operations together with Investment Delivery 
formed yet another customer for the technology supplier Andritz in order to 
re-focus on learning from ongoing operational issues. The case study also 
shows that clients may choose to foreground themselves as customers at points 
in the project where they perceive the risks to be high.  
 
 
4.2  The Pendolino for Virgin Trains’ West Coast Main Line Franchise 
 
The West Coast Main Line Pendolino project stemmed from a similar context 
to that of the RSTC, one of privatisation and the subsequent dispersal of 
expertise for producing capital goods. Virgin Trains is one of a new breed of 
Train Operating Companies that emerged out of the privatisation of British 
Rail. Virgin’s focus shaped the project from the ground up. It viewed the 
project as needing primarily to reflect its business case for upgrading the 
rolling stock on the WCML, such that it would be able to attract travellers 
away from both road and air. The business strategy for doing so was premised 
on dramatically shortened travel times (via 140mph running and good 
acceleration) and more frequent services. A critical part of Virgin’s vision was 
for a re-definition of the passenger experience of train travel as something 
more akin to air travel, and hence the interior design of the train assumed 
greater significance than was usually the case in such a rail industry project.  
 
From Alstom’s perspective as the train manufacturer, the key aspect of the 
contract was that Virgin wanted neither to own nor maintain the trains it was 
to operate. Alstom’s contract with Virgin trains was not for a certain number 
of train sets, but for the availability of 140 mph ‘tilting trains’ to fulfil the 
journey diagram requirements of their 15 year (12 when the build time was 
subtracted) franchise on the UK West Coast main-line. Critically, Alstom 
would retain responsibility for maintaining the trains and delivering them to 
the platform, every morning of the year for the remainder of the franchise.  
 
The long-term service provision aspect of the contract, it was somewhat 
understatedly suggested by the Project Director: “…made things a little bit 
different in terms of the approach to design and development”. Alstom needed 
to produce a train that it could profitably maintain over the life of Virgin’s 
franchise, not least because the Virgin contract determined a regime in which 
there were bonuses/penalties against performance criteria over the length of 
the franchise. In terms of maintenance, Alstom was, in effect, to become both 
producer and customer for the train.    
 
4.2.1 Creating internal customers - West Coast Traincare 
 
Like NWL, Alstom was aware that engineers typically focus on shorter term 
issues: “We have to pull them back sometimes and get them to design trade-
offs for the long-term” (Alstom Project Director). Alstom’s key action to 
ensure that long-term maintenance considerations were at the heart of the 
project was to make their maintenance operation, West Coast Traincare, the 
contract holder with Virgin. In this way WCTc became a key actor in the 
project and the manufacturing teams’ effective customer with respect to 
maintenance issues. To support this input into the design process, WCTc 
created the Reliability and Maintainability group, which drove the interaction 
with suppliers over these issues through ‘reliability seminars’ involving both 
designers and suppliers.  
 
To facilitate this interaction, and that of others in the project, Alstom also 
created a large single room design studio where multi-functional teams 
responsible for the design of the different aspects of the train were co-located. 
Meetings with suppliers, Virgin and its consultants were held in the same 
space, meaning that it was easy for them to interact directly with the various 
design teams. Success in fostering maintenance input was variable, however. 
As one senior manager put it:  
 
“We have had a team of ten maintenance engineers in the design studio from 
day one. You would have thought that if they had done their job properly their 
input to the design would mean that they wouldn’t complain about how 
difficult the train is to maintain, but that’s exactly what they did on the ‘glass 
case train’ on Friday!”   
 
Having said this, there was also no doubt that engineers could themselves be 
resistant to input from maintenance. As the project director revealed: “It is 
difficult to get the ideas in place when people are working flat out to get the 
train built… [moreover] Engineers don’t always like taking advice from other 
people, from outsiders as it were”. 
 
4.2.2 Alstom Paris 
 
Another factor here was that Alstom’s Head Office in Paris was quite clear in 
its expectation that the Washwood Heath assembly plant in Birmingham 
should make a profit from the build and not just the maintenance contract, as 
had been the case on a previous contract to supply and maintain rolling stock 
to the London Underground for its Northern Line. In some senses, Paris acted 
as a further customer – creating a further set of demands that attempted to 
shape outputs in particular ways – requiring a certain level of return on the 
capital build phase of the project. 
 
4.2.3 Virgin Trains 
 
Virgin’s role as the client is interesting in that it reflected similar dilemmas to 
those faced by NWL; the varying degrees to which it should become involved 
in shaping different components of the design. Virgin’s primary interest was in 
the appearance and interior design of the train. Maintenance issues in the 
design did not concern it, because that had been outsourced to the 
manufacturer, but it was very concerned about aspects of the train that would 
directly affect its ability to encourage passengers onto the trains. That is to 
say, it needed to act as the customer for some aspects of the design but not 
others. 
 
Virgin became involved in the design process directly. According to the 
Procurement Director, Virgin and its design consultants had spent “vast 
amounts of time involving themselves in the design and re-design of the 
lighting inside the new carriages” and had aspirations for the design that 
pushed Alstom beyond its previous capabilities. Customer interaction with the 
design created the need for around 70 different mock-ups before the design 
was stabilised.  
 
4.2.4 Angel Trains 
 
As already noted, Virgin and WCTc were not the only customers in this 
project. Indeed, Angel Train’s appearance in this project, as a customer with a 
specific and further set of requirements, is symptomatic of an emerging trend 
in projects for external funding and dispersed ownership – where the owner is 
not actually the user/operator of the capital good produced.  In this case, the 
train was to be owned by Angel Trains, an arm of the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Angel, unlike Virgin, demanded that its investment should be durable enough 
to possess a residual value long after Virgin’s franchise had ended (trains can 
last to 35 years and beyond). Although a key part of Virgin's contract with 
Angel involved Virgin taking responsibility for the train’s durability, Angel 
recognised that its perspective of the train as an asset with long-term residual 
value was not quite the same as Virgin’s understanding of it as part of a 12 
year revenue generating service. As Angel’s project manager noted: 
  
“We recognised that Angel and Virgin’s interest were about 90% aligned.  
Their interests are the initial term, ours the very long-term. We agreed that 
Virgin would be the project manager as Angel’s managing agents. They do the 
day-to-day oversight of the build of the train; I oversee what Virgin do from a 
long-term perspective.”  
 
 For example: 
  
“If they [Virgin] take too short-term a view I get them to check things out or 
arrange changes through Alstom. As an example, there are some attachments 
to the under frame that Virgin had accepted but we refused. Only six bolts 
were to be fitted that will corrode and fatigue. The equipment could come off 
a train travelling at 140mph – this is not acceptable – it will need to be re-
engineered before we will accept the train and our next stage payment to 
Alstom will depend on its resolution”. 
 





In this project there is a plethora of customers, all with claims on the design. 
Alstom’s own maintenance operations were defined as the customer by 
Alstom as a way of focusing its design teams on maintenance issues. Virgin 
was a critical customer, but only for certain aspects of the design (primarily 
interiors). Virgin also acted as the customer on behalf of Angel. While Angel, 
recognising that its interests were not completely aligned with Virgin, took on 
a monitoring role, rather than field the sort of project team that would warrant 
its recognition as a critical customer by Alstom’s project team. 
 
4.3  The port facility for an Argentinean Steelworks 
 
The project described here was for the supply, refurbishment and operation of 
dockside materials handling equipment for Siderar, Argentina’s largest steel 
producer, by Clarke Chapman Ltd (CCL), at that time a part of the materials 
handling division of Rolls-Royce (RRMH). Following privatisation, Siderar 
had decided to concentrate its efforts and investment on its core business of 
steel production and to outsource the operation of its port facility on the Rio 
Parana, upstream of Buenos Aires, through which it imported bulk iron ore, 
coal and limestone and exported finished steel products. The bulk handling 
facility had been built in the 1950s with some subsequent modifications, but 
by the mid 1990s the port had become costly for Siderar to operate owing to 
ageing machinery, poor maintenance routines and inefficient management 
practices. 
 
In order to participate in this project, CCL formed a joint venture with Portia, 
the consultancy arm of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, a long 
standing customer of the company. The key to this project was a long-term 
concession to refurbish, operate and manage the complete port facility for 
Siderar. The joint venture established a company in Argentina, SOM SA, to 
manage the project on site.  
 
Engineers at Siderar had many of their own ideas and communicated these to 
the SOM SA team. For instance, the plant had an intermediary stockyard 
where the ore was stored after being unloaded and the Siderar engineers 
wanted to eliminate this. The specification that came from Siderar, however, 
was primarily based around how it wanted throughput to increase over time. 
Although it wanted to know what equipment would be needed and when it 
would be installed over the 12 year concession, and although it suggested 
ways to achieve their own goals, ultimately CCL had the right to apply its own 
solutions. Having said this, the contract with Siderar was such that if for any 
reason SOM SA was unable to deliver goods or materials under the agreed 
tonnage then it was to provide an alternative supply or service at its own 
expense. CCL’s position was, thus, very similar to that of Alstom’s in that it 
was contracted to take long-term responsibility for the capital goods delivered. 
Within the joint venture, CCL was responsible for maintenance and Portia was 
responsible for operations.  
 
4.3.1 Internal versus external customers 
 
SOM SA, rather than Siderar, therefore became the effective customer for the 
equipment supplied in the project. SOM SA placed orders through CCL to 
various RRMH subsidiaries and other external suppliers to design and/or build 
new equipment for the port. Equipment was designed in the UK or France, 
built in Hungary, shipped from Croatia and finally installed and commissioned 
in Argentina. Refurbishment of existing plant and equipment, receipt of new 
equipment and assistance with its assembly in Argentina was 'contracted' to 
Rolls-Royce Industrial Power Overseas Projects (RRIPOP). Each European-
based CCL/RRMH unit involved in the project managed its own contribution 
and its own supply chain. As a result of this, and because at the time there was 
no common supply chain management system in place, the equipment delivery 
side of the project was fragmented. As one senior manager in CCL 
commented, “… certainly we were not integrated into a common purpose”. 
 
For example, one internal supplier, despite having designed to the 
specification provided by CCL, had not designed the equipment ‘in the spirit’ 
of the contract (i.e. with maintainability in mind). In particular the robustness 
of some of the equipment delivered, such as a grab ship unloader, in relation to 
the long-term project requirements was questioned. For example, on the grab 
ship unloader there were 10 motors dependent upon one drive, which was a 
problem for reliability should this single drive fail for any reason and, 
therefore, of potential financial consequence for SOM SA and, therein, CCL. 
A philosophy of ongoing value engineering also meant that incremental cost 
savings were sought through minor changes to the calculations for each new 
piece of equipment. Each time a new but similar machine was developed 
existing designs were modified “…little bit by little bit on different jobs” 
(CCL Engineering Manager). This is a straightforwardly ‘first cost’ 
philosophy which, while embedded in the organisation, was at odds with SOM 
SA’s requirements for equipment that was durable and  reliable over the long-
term. CCL staff working on the Siderar project were quick to point out the 
flaws in this approach.  
 
Ultimately, because the internal suppliers were managed as individual 
business units with their own balance sheets, they were naturally more 
interested in the price they could charge SOM SA for the equipment being 
supplied. They effectively viewed SOM SA as an external customer. As one 
respondent put it: 
 
 “My job is to get the machine out of the door on time ... business units are 
measured on performance individually … We [internal supply company] are 
operating as if we were outside [the organisation]” (Internal Supply  
Manager). 
 
The internal supplier also benefited from any spare parts required by the 
customer post delivery, either because the equipment had broken down or as 
part of regular maintenance requirements. Indeed, this was treated as an 
important source of revenue. The fact that the parent company itself was 
incurring the cost through its involvement in SOM SA was not acknowledged 
and perceived to be of little practical consequence. 
 
“Nothing would please me more – and I will probably thump them as hard as I 
can …that’s the way my performance is measured.” (Internal Supplier 
Manager). 
 
Although, as we have noted, facilities management provision was becoming 
more important than the capital products in the portfolio of CCL, it was the 
engineered product rather than long-term facilities management that was at the 
core of the company’s culture. Internal suppliers had not recognised that the 
parent company had become the customer of the product. As one senior 
manager put it to us, referring to the engineers within the company, they were 
inclined to “produce a beautiful crane and then stand back as and say ‘go on, 




Although ultimately very successful, it is clear that the CCL project was 
handicapped by a fragmented internal supply system over which SOM SA was 
unable to exert the proper leverage. Although Siderar was the client for this 
project, it is SOM SA that was the customer for the manufactured goods. 
Setting up SOM SA provided local control over the project and created a 
customer focus for internal suppliers. Problematically, some of the suppliers 
did not recognise SOM SA’s long term role in the project as a service-provider 
and treated it as an external customer. The failure to predict that this would be 
the case cost CCL in lost profit opportunities in the early part of the operation.    
 
 
5 Discussion: implications for managing the design and innovation 
 process 
 
ETO manufacturers have been used to designing and manufacturing for well-
defined customers, whose requirements are clearly specified and understood 
by engineering designers within the organisation. The implications of the 
increasing complexity exhibited by long-term service-focused projects of the 
type illustrated in this article are that the identification of the customer can 
become problematic in as much as the requirements for project success 
become fragmented and dispersed amongst a wider set of agents, some of 
whom will be obvious, whilst others may be hidden by prevailing 
organisational structures and lines of management.  
 
As the NWL case demonstrates, there may be more than one customer within 
the organisation. The case reveals clearly the need to identify different 
customers at different points in the project and to empower them to shape 
project outcomes. Many successes in achieving this were evident in the Project 
Sponsor role and the DOG group. The case of the Pendolino also revealed a 
proliferation of customers. Moreover, these different customers had very 
different interests in what was built. For Virgin it was appearance and 
reliability, for Alstom (in the guise of WCTc) it was maintainability and 
reliability and for Angel it was longevity. The CCL project shows how SOM 
SA, despite being a joint venture between CCL and its partner Portia, was 
nevertheless perceived by internal supply companies as an external customer, 
from whom a first cost profit should be extracted. The failure of the project, in 
this respect, was to put SOM SA in the role of the customer without affording 
it the authority it needed properly to shape the outputs of its suppliers. For 
instance, SOM SA, unlike Alstom, had no means to pass on the risks of poor 
reliability to its suppliers.  
 
What is clear is that, in the types of long-term service-focused projects we 
have described, if contractors and manufacturers focused solely on what the 
client alone wanted (i.e. the organisation with which they have the contract) 
they could fail to make a profit or worse. Because contractors are taking on 
some of the downstream responsibilities for the capital facility, they must also 
view themselves as customers for that facility. 
 
Complex ETO products and the projects set up to deliver them are not unitary 
entities, but are fragmented into numerous different aspects of design, supply, 
organisation and management. Clients may see their high levels of 
involvement in some aspects as critical to their interests but not others. Many 
clients rely on consultants and other third parties to act as the ‘voice of the 
customer’ and those charged with the task of managing the project on behalf 
of the ETO organisation may be uncertain to whom they should be listening 
and responding at any one time. Customers should be actively identified, 
defined and constructed as a strategic response to the demands and 
responsibilities of any given project. Correctly identifying, defining and 
constructing ‘the customer’ is an important aspect of getting the design right 
for the contractor. However, the case studies suggest that this not always easy; 
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